We explore the evolution of the speculative activity in futures carbon markets, by combining volume and open interest data. A comparison of the three phases in the European market is also provided. The evidence provided is consistent with: (i) a high degree of speculative behavior in the moment of listing the contracts for the first time, for every Phase; (ii) a higher level of speculation in the first quarter of each year (which could be explained by the increase of the number of informed traders in the market during these months, in relation with the specific schedule of deadlines that characterizes the EU Emission Trading Scheme); (iii) Phase II of the EU ETS seems to be the most speculative phase to date; and (iv) the front contract concentrates the majority of the speculative activity every year.
INTRODUCTION

Since the launch by the European Commission of the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005, the European carbon market has developed considerably in terms of the types of contracts being traded and their associated trading volumes. The new market has attracted the attention of a rising number of market participants and academics alike.
Researchers have analyzed several aspects of the European carbon market. Without being exhaustive, some of the issues studied include, among others, the determinants of carbon prices (Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) , Alberola et al. (2008) , Creti et al. (2012) , among others), modeling of carbon prices (for example Benz and Truck (2009) , Daskalakis et al. (2009) , among others), the study of the relationships between carbon prices and energy prices (Bunn and Fezzi (2009) , Keppler and MansanetBataller (2010) , Fell (2010) , among others), stylized facts of CO 2 returns (Medina and Pardo (2012) , etc. As pointed out by Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2008) , most of the European Union Allowances or EUAs trades are made in the derivative market and, accordingly, the carbon futures market is more important with regard to volume of trading than the spot one. Accordingly, most of the articles use futures data from the European Climate Exchange as they are considered the most representative carbon market prices.
Traditionally, market participants in derivative markets may be classified into two broad categories: speculators and hedgers (or informed and uninformed traders, respectively).
As far as we know, the evolution of the speculative and hedging activities in carbon markets has been left unexplored to date. The objective of this paper is to fill this gap and analyze the speculation and hedging activities in carbon markets, by using measures that combine volume and open interest data in order to explore which of the these two categories is predominant in the futures market during a specific period of time.
Provided that the majority of the carbon trades in the EU ETS take place throughout the derivatives market, analyzing the speculative and hedging behavior of market participants in this market is especially relevant.
Specifically, we consider the measures proposed by (i) Garcia et al. (1986) and (ii) Lucia and Pardo (2010) . These two measures are based on the convention, generally accepted in the previous literature on futures markets (see Rutledge (1979) , Leuthold (1983) , and Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) ) that volume gathers information about speculation whereas open interest is related to hedgers' activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the measures of the speculation and hedging activities are described, in section 3 the specificities of the carbon market are presented and the database described, section 4 presents the empirical analysis and the results, and section 5 concludes.
MEASURING THE IMPORTANCE OF SPECULATION IN FUTURES
MARKETS
In order to analyze the relative importance of speculation versus hedging activities in carbon markets, we employ several ratios that combine publicly available information from derivatives markets, related to both the volume traded during a specific period of It is important to emphasize that the volume has been considered in the literature as a proxy of the speculative behavior, whereas the open interest has been considered as a proxy of the hedging activity (Rutledge (1979) , Leuthold (1983) , and Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) ). The underlying idea is that hedgers tend to hold their futures market position longer than speculators. Note that the volume takes into account all the amount of trading activity while the open interest only registers the number of outstanding contracts and thus, the intraday positions taken by day traders are not reflected in the latter. Consequently, the ratios that will be analyzed in this study, when relating these two variables, represent proxies of the relative importance of the speculative or hedging behavior of the participants in the market during the period of study.
1 For an example, see Lucia and Pardo (2010) .
Two different ratios will be considered in this paper.
2 Specifically, the first ratio considered, denoted SPEC in this paper, was suggested by Garcia et al. (1986) The second ratio taken into account in this study is a modification of SPEC that was firstly proposed by Lucia and Pardo (2010) , which is in turn based on a previous ratio proposed by ap Gwilym et al. (2002 
SPECIFICITIES OF THE EUROPEAN CARBON MARKET AND DATA
The European carbon market has some specific characteristics that have to be taken into account when analyzing the speculative and hedging behavior of its market participants.
Those specificities are described in this section. Secondly, in order to analyze the dynamics of speculation in this market, we have aggregated the daily data available from the ICE web page in weekly data. Additionally, it is necessary to take into account that the EU ETS is organized in phases. From the daily data we have also built up three so-called front contract weekly series. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Based on the ratios described in section 2, we analyze the evolution throughout time of the speculative/hedging behavior in the European carbon market during each one of the three Phases of the EU ETS by using weekly data. The time series dynamics of the ratios are depicted in Figure 1 . Several important insights may be gained by a casual inspection of the graphs included in Figure 1 .
[Please insert Figure 1 ]
Recall that weekly changes in the volume to open interest ratio potentially capture weekly changes in speculative activity. Provided that the SPEC ratio takes high starting values for the three Phases, this indicates a high degree of speculative behavior in the moment of listing the contracts for the first time for each Phase. Additionally, the degree of speculation decreases over time for Phase I ( Figure 1A ), whereas in Phases II ( Figure 1B ) and III ( Figure 1C ) is similar: after high levels of speculation, this ratio fall sharply and then it begins to increase steadily. Furthermore, the information provided by the graphics of the HEDG measure is quite similar: while the HEDG ratio increases along the Phase I period ( Figure 1D ), which implies dismissing speculative activities, it decreases for Phases II ( Figure 1E ) and III ( Figure 1F ), after a period of high values, indicating a relative increase of speculative activities following that period.
If we focus on the front contract, we can observe that since April 2006, when the information about the real emissions of the most carbon intensive European industries was disseminated, the speculation behavior became relatively small in the Phase I Front contract ( Figure 1A and 1D) compared to the speculation behavior in the Phase II Front contract ( Figure 1B and 1E ). Note that since that date, the interest in Phase I was considerably diminishing for several reasons (i) as it has been mentioned, it was not possible to bank allowances from the Phase I to Phase II, and (ii) the information that arrived to the market was that the global offer of allowances was higher than the total demand for that period provoking a collapse in Phase I prices, as shown in Figure 2 , and an increase in the interest for Phase II. These two facts may have raised the speculators' interest in Phase II.
[Please, insert Figure 2] A seasonal pattern also emerges during the first quarter in every year (this quarter is marked with dashed vertical lines in Figure 1 ). Both measures show an increment in the degree of speculation, or informed trading, in all the Phases during the first quarter. This could be explained by the specific schedule of deadlines set by the EU ETS and graphically summarized in Figure 3 .
[Please, insert Figure 3 ]
Firstly, at the end of the month of February, the most emission-intensive companies receive their permits for the starting year. Secondly, one month later, by March 31 st , each participant in the scheme has to submit to the European Commission the verified emissions report corresponding to the previous year. Thirdly, by the end of April, the allowances covering the real emissions of the previous year must be surrendered.
Finally, the European Commission has until mid-May, to make public those reports.
Thus, the companies having a binding emission reduction target, which know exactly their real emissions, may make use of this information during the first quarter of the year. Note that, each year, during the months of March and April, the most emissionintensive industries have in their accounts EUAs for two different years that may be used for compliance within the ongoing phase and also in the next phase (except for the end of Phase I where no bankability was permitted). Therefore, they can manage its inventory of EUAs during this two months taking into account different strategies. They can: (i) surrender the EUAs corresponding to the previous year real emissions, (ii) sell them in the market, or (iii) maintain the EUAs in their accounts.
In order to confirm these insights, we now examine some relevant statistics. First, we will try to state the global picture of the speculation versus hedging activities for each one of the phases. To this aim, the mean, the median and the variation coefficient (defined as the mean divided by the standard deviation) are presented for the front contract of each phase, in Table 1. [Please, insert Table 1] The statistics included in this table confirm that when the SPEC median value is high, the HEDG median value is small. Additionally, the median values indicate that according to SPEC, there is more speculation in Phase I whereas based on HEDG there was less speculation in Phase I. On the contrary, both measures point to Phase II of the EU ETS as the most speculative demand attracting phase in mean terms.
Additionally, in order to complete these findings, we have carried out the analysis of the evolution of the speculative versus hedging demands by year, separately for each distance to the maturity of the contracts. With that purpose, we have obtained for each year of each Phase the mean, the median and the variation coefficient for the two ratios from the first December front contract (Near 1) to the fifth one (Near 5).
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[Please, insert coincide to indicate that the contract that attracted the highest degree of speculation was the December 2008 contract. This result is consistent with the graphs presented in Figure 1 . As it has been mentioned above, the banking restriction between Phase I and Phase II of the EU ETS provoked that Phase I and Phase II allowances reacted to 9 ap Gwilym, Buckle, and Evans (2002) 
CONCLUSIONS
We have used two measures that combine volume and open interest data in order to explore the relative importance of the speculation versus hedging activities in carbon futures markets.
Both measures indicate a high degree of speculative behavior in the moment of listing the contracts for the first time, for every Phase. Additionally, the degree of speculation diminishes over time for Phase I, whereas the pattern over time in Phases II and III, however, differs: after high levels of speculative activity, it falls sharply and then it began to increase steadily.
For each year, independently of the Phase, we have detected a higher level of speculation in the first quarter of each year. This seasonal pattern could be explained by the increase of the number of informed traders in the market during these months, caused by the specific schedule of deadlines that characterizes the EU ETS.
Both measures point to Phase II of the EU ETS as being the most speculative phase, and they also point out that the front contract is the future contract that concentrates the majority of the speculative activity in every year, whereas the hedging demand focus on the furthest available maturities. For each year of the EU ETS, the mean, the median and the variation coefficient of the first nearest December contract (Near 1), the second nearest December contract (Near 2), the third nearest December contract (Near 3), the fourth nearest December contract (Near 4), and the fifth nearest December contract (Near 5) are obtained for each ratio (SPEC and HEDG, respectively) using the weekly data.
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